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CHALLENGING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: SIXTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISCRIMINATORY
USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Attorneys commonly use peremptory challenges1 in jury selection to
effect a fair and impartial jury.2 Notwithstanding the importance courts
accredit to this function,3 the peremptory challenge should not survive a
conflict with constitutionally protected rights.4
Courts perpetually struggle to reconcile those rights guaranteed by the
sixth and fourteenth amendments with the unconstrained nature of per-
emptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky5 marked the Supreme Court's
first overt intrusion6 into the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.
The Court held a prosecutor violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment7 if his peremptory challenges exclude venire
members8 based on their race.9 Further, the Court reduced the eviden-
tiary burden required of a defendant to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.10
The Court in Batson specifically declined to express a view on the mer-
1. A "peremptory challenge," as opposed to a challenge for cause, allows an attorney to ex-
clude a potential juror without a reason. See, eg., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 n. 9 (1965)
(quoting 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809)) ("Ain arbitrary and capricious spe-
cies of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all ... is called a
peremptory challenge .. ") (emphasis in original)). "Challenges for cause have the virtue of being
unlimited, and peremptories have the advantage of not needing to be defended." J. VAN DYKE,
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS
140 (1977).
2. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and
Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 1195, 1199 (1987).
3. Swain, 380 U.S. at 211; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated,
478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
4. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130. If a peremptory challenge does conflict with a constitutionally
protected right, "it is the inscrutability of the peremptory challenge that must yield, not the constitu-
tional right." Id.
5. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. Prior to Batson, the Court relied on the stringent standard in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965). See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Because of its stringency, this test left the
peremptory challenge relatively untouched.
7. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. A jury pool or "venire" refers to the panel of potential jurors summoned. From this group,
the actual or "petit jury" is selected.
9. 476 U.S. at 96.
10. 476 U.S. at 93-98. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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its of the petitioner's sixth amendment11 claims.12 However, a number of
federal circuit courts have considered the potential for a sixth amend-
ment "fair cross section" objection to the petit jury's composition. 13
Despite its narrow holding, the Batson decision has created contro-
versy and confusion. 4 Prior to Batson, the potential of a sixth amend-
ment claim was important because of the difficulty of obtaining relief
against peremptories under an equal protection theory. 5 Even though
Batson eased the restrictions on equal protection claims, a viable sixth
amendment claim remains valuable because of Batson's limitations.
First, Batson is not retroactive,' 6 whereby it deprives many defendants 7
11. The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. 476 U.S. at 84-85 n.4. "The Court has avoided any confrontation between the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of an impartial jury and the peremptory challenge, although Batson presented a ripe
opportunity for such an appraisal of these apparently conflicting principles." Note, supra note 2, at
1204.
The sixth amendment guarantee applies to criminal matters only. This Note, therefore, analyzes
the peremptory challenges solely as used in criminal prosecutions. This Note will not discuss per-
emptory challenges regarding civil litigation except to note "[t]he Batson rationale has not widely
been held to apply" there. D. Breck, Peremptory Strikes after Batson v. Kentucky, A.B.A. J., 54, 60
(April 1, 1988). But see, eg., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989) (Batson applies to civil
as well as criminal cases); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988)
(same).
13. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth
amendment right to an "impartial" jury as guaranteeing a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1975). See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 723 (1961) (guarantee of "impartial, indifferent jurors"); Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 767-68,
770 (6th Cir. 1985) (further discussion of what amounts to an impartial jury), remanded, 478 U.S.
1001, aff'd, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Several lower courts have extended Taylor's requirement of a fair cross section in the jury pool to
a fair cross section in the petit jury. This creates the possibility that a venire's improper cross see-
tional composition will carry over to the actual jury. See, e.g., Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214,
226-27 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989); Booker, 775 F.2d at 772; McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1129 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
14. See, eg., Bologna, Batson v. Kentucky: The Hybrid Peremptory Challenge, 1 DET. C.L.
REv. 151, 163-67 (1987) (Batson has the "appearance" of settling the debate regarding peremptory
challenges, but it leaves many questions unanswered).
15. Before Batson, the challenger had to overcome a virtually impossible burden of proof to
establish an equal protection violation. See supra note 6, infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
16. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259-261 (1986) (Batson decision not retroactive on collateral
review of convictions made final prior to Batson opinion). The Court defined "final" as" 'where the
judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition
for certiorari had elapsed before' . . . Batson v. Kentucky." Id. at 258 n.1 (quoting Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)).
17. Batson will not apply to defendants who initially challenged jury composition any time




of its decreased burden of proof."8 Because the Court stripped pre-Bat-
son defendants of a feasible equal protection claim by denying retroactiv-
ity, they must look for alternative grounds to challenge a jury make-up. 19
Second, the scope of a sixth amendment claim may be broader than an
equal protection challenge. While unavailable to date under the equal
protection clause, a sixth amendment claim would provide a defendant
with a vehicle to challenge the jury composition on nonracial grounds.20
Moreover, a sixth amendment challenge eliminates the problem of stand-
ing potentially raised by an equal protection claim.2 1  Finally, sixth
amendment and equal protection challenges may provide distinct
18. Batson, as opposed to its predecessor Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), see supra note
6, permits a defendant to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory selection merely using
facts from the defendant's trial, rather than requiring a prior pattern of discriminatory exclusions.
See infra notes 49, 54-56 and accompanying text.
19. Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1987) (en bane), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989),
exemplifies a situation where timing dictated the unavailability of a Batson application. In Teague,
the defendant argued the sixth amendment requires the petit jury to "reflect the trial community."
820 F.2d at 836. See also McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1124 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S.
1001 (1986) (Swain burden not met, hence, decision rested on sixth amendment rather than equal
protection grounds).
20. The Supreme Court applies a "strict" level of scrutiny when analyzing race-based classifica-
tions under the equal protection clause. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); (The
"core" of the equal protection clause is to combat racial discrimination, thus, race-based classifica-
tions are "suspect" and merit "rigid scrutiny."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) ("All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect.... [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."); See also Alsehuler, The Over-
weight Schoolteacher from New Jersey and Other Tales: The Peremptory Challenge after Batson, 25
CRIM. L. BULL. 57, 65 (1989) ("Whether some nonracial forms of discrimination are as invidious as
racial discrimination [to merit such heightened scrutiny] remains a subject of dispute."). The
Supreme Court's holding in Batson rested only on race-based discrimination. Whether the Court
will broaden the scope of Batson to include other racial minority groups and women remains uncer-
tain.
A sixth amendment challenge rests on the right to a possible fair cross section of the community
on one's jury. It extends to discrimination against any cognizable group. See infra note 68. Of
course, a future clarification of "cognizability" (see infra note 68) will assist in defining the parame-
ters of a sixth amendment claim. See, e.g., Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death
Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1, 46 n.185 (1986) (While the Court in Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1946), recognized daily wage earners as cognizable for
fair cross section purposes, "it is unclear whether the Court considers Thiel to have precedential
significance in the sixth amendment context."). Hence, the nature of the underlying claim is poten-
tially broader for the sixth amendment claim than for equal protection. Unless the Court extends
Batson to groups such as women and daily wage earners, the availability of a sixth amendment claim
is imperative to combat alternative forms of systematic discrimination in jury selection.
21. Pursuant to article III of the United States Constitution, a person has standing to bring a
claim only if he meets three conditions. First, he must show a distinct and palpable injury. Second,
the challenged activity must have caused injury. Finally, the court must be able to redress the
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injury. 13A C. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3531.4
(1984).
The Supreme Court's current position on standing to challenge jury composition is muddled. In
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), six members of the Court held a white defendant had standing to
challenge the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury pool. Id. at 504. No majority of the
Court, however, agreed to the theory behind its holding. Justice Marshall's opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Stewart, recognized a due process violation "[w]hen any large and identifiable
segment of the community is excluded from jury service." Id. at 503 (opinion of Marshall, J,).
Justice Marshall explicitly declined to consider the defendant's equal protection claim. Id. at 497 n.5
(opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice White's opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, arrived at
a judgment granting standing without detailing its holding on either the due process or equal protec-
tion grounds. Instead, Justice White recognized a "central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment
with racial discrimination." Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Peters v. Kiffarticulates
a standard of eligibility to contest the exclusion of a group from jury service. Moreover, the decision
is not based on the equal protection clause. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 65. Hence, Kifffails to set
clear precedent for lower courts to determine standing when the defendant asserts an equal protec-
tion claim based on the exclusion of a group from the petit jury. Compare, United States v. Town-
sley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (no basis exists for white defendant to argue the
prosecutor's exclusion of black jurors violated defendant's rights under the equal protection clause)
and United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir. 1988) (nonblack defendants cannot com-
plain about prosecutor's use of peremptories to eliminate blacks from jury) with United States v.
Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (citing Peters v. Kif, a white defendant has
standing to make a sixth amendment challenge to the exclusion of blacks from his jury), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 845 (1984) and United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799, 804 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(a defendant has standing to challenge-under the fourteenth amendment-the exclusion of a cogni-
zable group from his grand and petit juries, even though he is not a member of the group).
Perhaps because Kiffis a poor guide, lower courts rely more readily on the Court's language in
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), expressly requiring that the defendant be a member of
the excluded racial group. See, eg., Townsley, 856 F.2d at 1190; Anguilo, 847 F.2d at 985.
Thus, the issue of who has standing to make an equal protection challenge alleging racially based
exclusions from the petit jury remains unclear. Moreover, it is also uncertain whether Kiffwould
extend standing in an equal protection claim of gender based or some alternative discrimination. Of
course, the viability of such equal protection claims to date remains unclear. See infra note 138.
In contrast to an equal protection objection, a sixth amendment challenge may survive regardless
of the correlation between the defendant and the challenged jurors. In Teague, Justice Brennan,
noted that a sixth amendment extension:
would bar the prosecution from excluding venire persons from the petit jury on account of
their membership in some cognizable group even when the defendant is not himself a mem-
ber of that group, whereas the Equal Protection Clause might not provide a basis for relief
unless the defendant himself belonged to the group whose members were improperly
excluded.
Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1092 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Under a sixth amendment challenge, defendant would argue a violation of his right to a possible
fair cross section. The defendant might suffer a distinct and palpable injury if he were unable to
benefit from the diverse viewpoints or the impartiality that certain groups in the community might
afford. Therefore, any defendant could have standing if denied a fair cross section pursuant to the
prosecutor's systematic exclusion of a group of prospective jurors.
In K/if'the Court hypothesized that the white petitioner "would clearly have standing to challenge
the systematic exclusion of any identifiable group from jury service" if he brought the claim under




Resolution of the sixth amendment issue is crucial in understanding
the scope of peremptory challenges.23 Because of the conflict among the
circuit courts concerning the relevance of the sixth amendment to petit
juries,24 this issue is ripe for the Supreme Court's consideration.25
injures all defendants--even those who are not members of that class-because it eliminates the
potential for a cross section represented on the jury. Id. at 500.
The breadth of a sixth amendment claim, in contrast to that of an equal protection challenge,
would further expand the potential groups of defendants with valid challenges to their petit juries.
See supra note 20.
22. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979) (equal protection challenges are "not
entirely analogous" to fair cross section claims). But see Duren, 439 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (sixth amendment justification for classification by gender has strong overtones of equal
protection standard). See also Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1145 (11th Cir. 1987) (if sixth
amendment offered defendant any protection, this protection would be inseparable from protection
afforded under the equal protection clause); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1012 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1987) (same). Furthermore, as one commentator argues:
Although some observers maintain that the Sixth Amendment's "fair cross-section require-
ment" differs from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of equal protection and
looks to discriminatory effect rather than discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has
never suggested that the "fair cross-section requirement" forbids more than the "system-
atic" exclusion of distinctive groups from jury service. The difference between "deliberate"
exclusion and "systematic" exclusion is far from clear.
Alschuler, supra note 20, at 66 n.38 (citation omitted).
23. The danger in extending the fair cross section analysis to the petit jury is the resulting
"virtual limitlessness" of defendants' challenges to exclusions by prosecutors. McCray v. Abrams,
750 F.2d 113, 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) ("It effectively eliminates the peremptory
challenge for all but the most frivolous reasons (people who wear gray, smile, or wear contact
lenses)."), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
24. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
25. In a recent decision, Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) the Supreme Court once again
sidestepped a resolution of the sixth amendment controversy. See supra note 12 and accompanying
text; see infra note 57. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, held it unnecessary to consider whether to extend the fair cross section requirement to the
petit jury. O'Connor reasoned that a new rule would not retroactively apply to Teague because his
case reached the Court on collateral review, not on direct appeal. Id. at 1069 (opinion of O'Connor,
J.). Conversely, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun, not only believed the Court
should have decided the sixth amendment issue, but that it should have extended the fair cross
section requirement to the petit jury. Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment); 1092, 1094 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This split among the Justices merely heightens the sixth amendment issue.
For the distribution of votes and a further discussion of the Supreme Court's action in Teague, see
infra notes 61-62.
In Teague's lower court opinion, the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc refused to extend the sixth
amendment to the petit jury's composition. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Teague. Most recently, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in Roman v.
Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989). The Second Circuit in
Roman, unlike the circuit court in Teague, did utilize a sixth amendment analysis to examine the
peremptory challenges used in selecting a petit jury. 822 F.2d at 224-27.
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This Note considers the sixth amendment implications26 on the dis-
criminatory use27 of peremptory challenges in petit jury selection. Part I
introduces the history and intended purpose of peremptory challenges.
Part II examines the extent to which courts have limited attorneys' use of
peremptories. The section reviews both the equal protection approach
and federal courts' positions on sixth amendment guarantees regarding
the petit jury. Part III analyzes the merits of a sixth amendment claim.
Finally, Part IV considers alternatives to the existing peremptory chal-
lenge. This Note concludes that peremptory challenges should be elimi-
nated because of their procedural deficiencies and their innate failure to
effectuate their intended purpose.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The peremptory challenge, although not a constitutional right,28 has
existed since common law.29 Though originally a defendant's right,30 the
prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges developed by the nineteenth
century. 3 Today, both state and federal rules of procedure and statutes
grant defendants and prosecutors the right to utilize peremptory
challenges.32
26. The equal protection guarantee under the fourteenth amendment is the other major ground
for challenging the alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. While this Note focuses on
challenges based on the sixth amendment, the analysis will require some discussion of equal
protection.
27. While both prosecutors and defense attorneys can use peremptory challenges, see infra
notes 30-32 and accompanying text, only their discriminatory use by prosecutors is at issue in this
Note. See infra note 151 and accompanying text for a brief consideration of the defense's use of
peremptory challenges. Extensive consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
28. See, eg., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001
(1986).
29. See, eg., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211-14 (1965). See generally VAN DYKE, supra
note 1, at 147-51 (general discussion of development of peremptories).
30. Note, supra note 2, at 1198 (citing VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 85-175). See also Pointer v.
United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894) (the peremptory challenge is one of the most important rights of
the accused).
31. Note, supra note 2, at 1198-99.
32. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130. All state and federal courts permit some use of peremptory
challenges. See, eg., Bertolet, Peremptory Challenges Should be Eliminated in Criminal Trials, 34
ST. Louis B.J. 23 (1987). However, the number of challenges allowed to each party varies by juris-
diction. Swain, 380 U.S. at 217. In general, the number of allotted challenges increases with the
seriousness of the crime. Note, supra note 2, at 1197. In addition, the defense has more peremptory
challenges than the prosecution. Bologna, supra note 14, at 151. In the federal system each side in a
capital case receives twenty peremptories. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). In all other felonies, the defend.
ant receives ten peremptories and the prosecutor six. Id. In a misdemeanor prosecution each side is
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/10
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
In theory, the peremptory challenge's primary purpose is attaining an
"impartial" jury.3" By affording each litigant a limited number of un-
questioned juror exemptions, the selected jury will be partial to neither
party.
Peremptory challenges allow attorneys great latitude in the jury selec-
tion process. Unquestioned challenges allow removal of a potential juror
without expressing reasons for the actual challenge.34 Peremptories thus
provide an accepted mode for dismissing a legally qualified juror merely
because the attorney does not want that type of person on the jury. Be-
cause peremptories traditionally permitted exclusion without an explana-
tion, courts were unable to review for possibly unconstitutional
exclusions.
Thus, the peremptory challenge supplements "challenges for cause."3
entitled to three peremptory challenges. Id. See also 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE, § 385 (1982) (discussion of the use of peremptories in federal criminal trials).
33. Note, supra note 2, at 1199. Lord Coke defined "impartial" as "indifferent." 1 COKE,
COMMENTARIES UPON LITTLETON § 155b. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1960), the
Supreme Court adopted this definition of impartiality. Notwithstanding the sixth amendment's im-
partiality requirement, people's biases and opinions inevitably influence their decisions. Babcock,
Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 551 (1975). Nevertheless, an
essential component of the sixth amendment's impartiality guarantee is the selection of a petit jury
from a representative cross section of the community. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
528 (1975). Therefore, "[t]he reason for a cross section... is that it assures that a range of biases
and experiences will bear on the facts of the case." Babcock, supra, at 551.
Despite the sixth amendment's guarantee of an "impartial" jury, the litigants actually strive to
eliminate jurors potentially partial to the other side while keeping those biased for their own side.
Id. See also VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 140 ("Challenges are essentially a negative kind of selection
...."). Thus, the guarantee of "impartiality" as "indifference" is somewhat misleading in light of
these realities. Van Dyke recognized two factors affecting an attorney's ability to impanel a desirable
jury: (1) the number of peremptory challenges allotted, and how the attorney uses them, and (2) his
success in challenging for cause, in other words, proving bias to the judge's satisfaction. Id.
34. Babcock, supra note 33, at 553-54 ("[''he peremptory challenge . . . allows the covert
expression of what we dare not say but know is true more often that [sic] not."). Attorneys consider
factors such as race, religion, nationality, occupation and group affiliation in jury selection. Swain,
380 U.S. at 220-21. "The peremptory challenge is thus a nicety for disguising socially unpopular
prejudices, rationalized as a necessary tool for choosing what appears to be a 'fair' jury." Note,
supra note 2, at 1200.
35. See Krauss, Death-Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt: The Issues in Gray v. Missis-
sippi, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 507, 537 (1987) ("[P]eremptories allow the parties to exclude people whose
bias they can sense or infer, but not prove to the judge's satisfaction.") (footnote omitted). See also
Note, supra note 2, at 1200. A number of reasons justify a for cause challenge. See, eg, VAN DYKE,
supra note I, at 143 (citing typical state statute authorizing challenges for cause). A primary cause
for exclusion is a showing of bias. The peremptory challenge enables an attorney to exclude an
individual he or she suspects is biased without having to prove bias. Note, supra note 2, at 1200. See
also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ("[T]he peremptory permits rejection for a real or
1989]
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Peremptories provide a vehicle for eliminating potential jurors based on
an attorney's intangible uneasiness regarding that individual's likely per-
formance on a jury. This "uneasiness" alone would not justify disqualifi-
cation for "cause." Moreover, peremptories allow aggressive voir dire
without fear of provoking resentment or hostility in the prospective
juror.36
In Swain v. Alabama,37 the Court declared the use of peremptory chal-
lenges was to be "without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control. ' 3  The Court reasoned that when analyzed in light of
their intended purpose, peremptory challenges do not merit scrutiny.
Despite Swain, several courts have exercised a considerable degree of ju-
dicial scrutiny over the utilization of peremptory challenges.39 These
courts require attorneys to use their peremptories within the confines of
the sixth amendment's guarantee of impartiality and fair cross section of
the community. Such judicial scrutiny clearly encroaches upon the tradi-
tionally unqualified right which afforded attorneys wide latitude in jury
selection.
II. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
A. Equal Protection Analysis
Strauder v. West Virginia I provides the foundation for nondiscrimina-
tory jury selection analysis. In Strauder, the Supreme Court held the
state's purposeful exclusion of black jurors deprived Strauder, a black
defendant, of his right to equal protection. *" Although Strauder did not
imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68, 70 (1887))).
Attorneys also use peremptory challenges to exclude an individual for other, less tenuous reasons,
including: (1) "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices" conceived from the person's looks
and gestures, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892), cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 220, and
(2) the juror's "habits and associations," Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70, cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
36. See Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376, cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 220; Krauss, supra note 35, at 537;
Note, supra note 2, at 1200. See also Babcock, supra note 33, at 554-55 ("ITihe peremptory chal-
lenge is . . . a shield for the exercise of the challenge for cause. Questioning ... may have so
alienated a potential juror that, although the lawyer has not established any basis for removal, the
process itself has made it necessary to strike the juror peremptorily.").
37. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
38. Id. at 220.
39. See, eg., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 113, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984) (peremptory challenge not
beyond scrutiny under the sixth amendment or the equal protection clause), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001
(1986). See supra note 13.
40. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
41. Id. at 310.
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involve peremptory challenges,42 it did require impartiality in venire se-
lection.43 Other cases have extended the equal protection guarantee to
both grand juries' and petit juries. 45
The legal principle expressed in Strauder46 was instrumental in guid-
ing the permissible use of peremptory challenges.47 In Swain v. Ala-
bama,48 the Supreme Court held it would find improper and purposeful
discrimination by the State only when the defendant proved systematic
juror exclusion over a period of time, solely based on race.49 This eviden-
tiary burden, however, was nearly impossible to satisfy. 0 Coupling the
defendant's difficult burden with the long recognized good faith pre-
sumption afforded prosecutors, 51 the Court showed its reluctance to im-
pinge upon the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges.52 While
the Court could not condone the unconstitutional discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges, it clearly tried to protect the unqualified nature
of peremptories by making their impermissible use so difficult to prove.
42. Strauder involved a West Virginia statute which provided only white males were eligible to
participate on a jury. Id. at 305. The Court vacated the defendant's murder conviction by such a
restricted jury and ordered the case retried in federal court. Id. at 312.
43. Id. at 308-09.
44. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (judge held liable for discriminatory grand
jury selection in violation of equal protection clause).
45. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965). See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
626 n.3 (1972) (no petit/grand jury distinction for purposes of the fourteenth amendment) (citing
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939)); Bologna, supra note 14, at 154.
46. In Strauder, the Court reasoned:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied ... all right to
participate ... as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in
other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them,. . . an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
100 U.S. at 308.
47. See, eg., Bertolet, supra note 32, at 23.
48. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
49. Id. at 227. In Swain, an all-white jury convicted a black defendant of raping a white girl.
The prosecutor utilized his peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from selection. Despite the
fact that no black had served on a jury in that jurisdiction since 1950, petitioner failed to satisfy his
evidentiary burden. Id. at 226.
50. Note, supra note 2, at 1203 (citing State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162 (La. 1979)); State v.
Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (only two cases ever to satisfy evidentiary burden set by Swain).
5 1. The Swain Court approved the existence of a presumption in each case that the prosecutor
fairly and impartially used his peremptory challenges. 380 U.S. at 222.
52. The Court was concerned about subjecting the prosecutor's challenge to equal protection
demands. Id. at 221. It feared requiring an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for challenge
would radically alter the nature and operation of the challenge. Id. at 222.
Washington University Open Scholarship
556 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:547
In Batson v. Kentucky,5 3 the Supreme Court's reluctance to intrude
upon prosecutorial discretion came to an end. The Court concluded, "a
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial "54 Contrary to
the good faith presumption in Swain,55 the Batson Court recognized that
peremptory challenges permit "those to discriminate who are of a mind
to discriminate."56 The decreased standard of proof approved in Batson
affords defendants a greater opportunity to prove the unconstitutional
use of peremptories. Batson will undoubtedly promote more frequent
claims contesting a prosecutor's peremptory challenges.
The Supreme Court, however, narrowly stated the Batson holding,
resting the decision solely on equal protection principles.5 7 Thus, the
53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). InBatson, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude all
four black veniremen from the petit jury. An all-white jury convicted the black defendant of bur-
glary in the second degree.
54. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). Hence, the Court rejected the evidentiary burden it imposed in
Swain. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The defendant no longer must establish a " 'long-
continued unexplained absence' of members of his race 'from many panels.'" 476 U.S. at 95 (quot-
ing Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion)). In Batson the Court permitted a
defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on the following show-
ings: membership in a "cognizable racial group;" prosecutor's removal of members of defendant's
race from the venire; and facts that allow an inference that the prosecutor excluded veniremen from
the petit jury solely on account of their race. 476 U.S. at 96-97. Once defendant makes the prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a "neutral" explanation for his chal-
lenges. Id.
In defining a "cognizable" group, the Batson Court cited Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977), which required a "recognizable, distinct class singled out for different treatment under the
laws." Id. at 494 (citations omitted).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
56. 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
57. 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. In the trial court, Batson alleged a violation of both his sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 83. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, contended that
petitioner brought both claims before the Supreme Court. Id. at 84 n.4. Justice Powell then resolved
petitioner's claims solely on equal protection grounds. Id. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger found
the Court's equal protection holding troublesome. Petitioner did not press the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection issue in Batson. On the contrary, petitioner argued the sixth amendment
guarantee of "an impartial jury and jury composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the
community." Brief for Petition of Certiorari, quoted in 476 U.S. at 113 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger noted that during oral argument, petitioner's attorney based his claim solely on
sixth amendment grounds. Id. at 113-14.
Question: Your claim is based solely on the Sixth Amendment?
Mr. Niehaus [Batson's attorney]: Yes.
Question: Is that correct?
Mr. Niehaus: That is what we are arguing, yes.
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status of the sixth amendment as a challenge to the discriminatory use of
peremptories in petit jury selection is unclear.
B. Sixth Amendment Analysis
1. The Supreme Court's Position
When the Court decided Swain v. Alabama,58 it had yet to apply the
sixth amendment's impartial jury guarantee to the states.59 Hence, the
Swain Court, in reviewing the state's use of peremptories, did not address
the sixth amendment. Controversy remains whether Swain grants consti-
tutional protection through the sixth amendment against discriminatory
petit jury selection.'"
To date, the Supreme Court has not held whether a defendant has a
sixth amendment right to a nondiscriminatory petit jury. Although a
majority of the Court declined to address the issue in Teague v. Lane,61
four Justices expressly approved of the sixth amendment extension to the
Question: You are not asking for a reconsideration of Swain, and you are making no
equal protection claim here. Is that correct?
Mr. Niehaus: We have not made an equal protection claim.
Id.
The Chief Justice explained that the Court should have asked the parties to brief the equal protec-
tion issue in addition to the sixth amendment, directed reargument on the issue, or dismissed the
petition "as improvidently granted." Id. at 115. The Court, however, refused. Id. at 114.
58. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
59. The Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court handed
down Swain in 1965.
60. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) ("We have never invoked the fair
cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for cause or peremptory challenges to prospec-
tive jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition
of the community at large."). The Court wrote the Lockhart decision more than twenty years after
its Swain opinion. This language suggests Swain did not invoke the sixth amendment. See also
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1124 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (constitu-
tional analysis in Swain focused on equal protection clause and nothing was intended to remove this
focus); People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042-43, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1052 (1982) ("Swain does
not apply to an accused's right not to have the State affirmatively frustrate his 6th Amendment right
to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community .. "); But see United States v. Childress,
715 F.2d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) (courts have
consistently followed the systematic exclusion analysis in Swain, both before and after Taylor, hence
Taylor does not overrule Swain).
If Taylor's sixth amendment analysis did not overrule Swain, arguably no subsequent authority
has. See Childress, 715 F.2d at 1320 ("Supreme Court has not reconsidered Swain and until that
time, of course, we must follow Swain."). If the contrary body of case law holds true, however, the
scope of the sixth amendment right to a nondiscriminatory petit jury is unclear, especially in light of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
61. 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069 (1989). See infra note 62. A majority of the court affirmed Teague's
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petit jury.62
2. Dissension among the Circuits
a. The Taylor Approach
The Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana,63 emphasized there is "no
requirement that petit juries actually mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the population." 64 Essentially, two
schools of thought exist among the circuit courts delineating the impact
of Taylor on the potential expansion of the sixth amendment right to a
fair cross section in the venire to the actual petit jury. Both views agree
that the Supreme Court has failed to sufficiently address the issue. How-
ever, the circuits are split in their reading of the Taylor language.
Under one approach this language is not a barrier to a sixth amend-
ment extension to the petit jury. For example, the Second Circuit, in
McCray v. Abrams 65 interpreted the Taylor holding66 to afford the de-
conviction on alternative grounds, concluding petitioner was procedurally barred from asserting his
equal protection claim under both Batson and Swain. Id. at 1067 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
Previously, the Court has deferred consideration of this issue by denying certiorari in several cases
petitioned to the Court. See, eg., Sgro v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1021 (1988); Jones v. Garrett, 108
S. Ct. 233 (1987); Michigan v. Booker, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); United States v. Childress, 464 U.S.
1063 (1984). Most recently, the Court declined to consider the issue in Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d
214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989).
62. See supra note 25. "The requirement [that the sixth amendment extend to the actual jury)
does not go far beyond our mandates in Taylor, Duren, and Batson; indeed, it flows quite naturally
from those decisions." Teague, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1092 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The ultimate resolution of the issue is uncertain. In Part IV of her opinion, Justice O'Connor
avoided expression of her view on the viability of the sixth amendment extension. Id. at 1069 (opin-
ion of O'Connor, J.). Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia and Kennedy, joined in
Justice O'Connor's decision to dismiss the issue on retroactivity grounds. Id. at 1065. Justice
White, however, concurred only with Parts I through III of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 1078
(White, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Hence, Justice White apparently does not approve
of Justice O'Connor's sidestepping of the sixth amendment issue. However, Justice White himself
chose not to address the issue. The positions on the sixth amendment extension of five Justices of the
Court are therefore unknown to date. The fact that the traditionally liberal branch of the Court
favored the extension may indicate the continuing viability of the issue. However, the fate of the
sixth amendment analysis rests in the hands of the five more conservative Justices of the Court.
63. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
64. Id. at 538. Taylor concerned the systematic exclusion of women from the jury venire. The
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for kidnapping because "the selection of a petit jury from
a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to ajury trial." Id. at 528. Hence, women as a class are no longer excludable from the venire if
exclusion produces an almost totally male venire. Id. at 537.
65. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). In McCray, the prosecutor
utilized his peremptory challenges to eliminate all blacks and Hispanics from the jury. Id. at 1114.
The all-white jury convicted McCray (who is black) of first and second degree robbery. Id. at 1115.
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fendant the possibility that the venire's representative character translates
to the petit jury.6 7 The McCray Court concluded the sixth amendment
prohibits the state from unreasonably restricting the chance of a fair
cross section of the community on a petit jury.6" This prohibition exists
during both the venire and petit jury selection processes.69
The Eighth Circuit, representing the opposing school of thought, does
not recognize a sixth amendment right against a prosecutor's allegedly
discriminatory use of his peremptory challenges in petit jury selection.
In United States v. Childress,7" the court interpreted the Taylor lan-
guage7 1 as expressly limiting the fair cross section analysis to the
72venire.
The court in McCray concluded a defendant "has no right to a petit jury of any particular composi-
tion." Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). However, the court stated this conclusion did not preclude all
sixth amendment effects on petit jury selection. Id. The court determined that the defendant estab-
lished a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on group affiliation. Id. at 1135. The
court remanded the case to afford the prosecutor the opportunity to rebut the defendant's prima
facie showing. Id.
66. The Court in Taylor held the jury venire-the pool from where the jury is drawn-must
fairly represent the community. 419 U.S. at 538. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. 750 F.2d at 1128-29. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537 ("ITihe Sixth Amendment affords the
defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn from venires representative of
the community .... "(emphasis added)).
68. 750 F.2d at 1129. To establish a prima facie case of a sixth amendment fair cross section
violation, the court adapted the standard established in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
750 F.2d at 1131. Retaining two of the three original Duren prerequisites, the court stated the
defendant must show an allegedly excluded group "cognizable... in the community" and a "sub-
stantial likelihood" the challenges were "made on the basis of the... venire persons' group affilia-
tion" as opposed to "any indication" that the individual was potentially unable to decide the case on
the evidence presented. 750 F.2d at 1131-32 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). In paraphrasing the
original Duren standard, the Second Circuit altered the first requirement to a "cognizable" group.
Duren originally required a "distinctive group," which is one "sufficiently numerous and distinct...
so that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-
section requirement cannot be satisfied." 439 U.S. at 364 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531). The
"contours" of what is "cognizable" are unclear. See, eg., Roman v. Abrams 822 F.2d 214, 227 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989); Krauss, supra note 20, at 46 nn.184 & 185. For a
further discussion of "cognizability," see Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983). Once
the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the prosecutor then must show the infringement has
"adequate justification" to be a "significant state interest." Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 & n.26. This
showing need not rise to the level of "cause." 750 F.2d at 1132.
69. 750 F.2d at 1129.
70. 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
71. See supra text accompanying note 64.
72. 715 F.2d at 1319-20. See also Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1983)
(defendant "not entitled to a jury of any particular composition").
In Childress, the prosecution utilized peremptory challenges to remove almost all black prospec-
tive jurors from the venire. The all-white jury convicted the defendant on firearm violations. At its
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Similarly, in Teague v. Lane, 3 the Seventh Circuit refused to extend
the sixth amendment analysis to the actual jury.74 Relying largely on a
series of decisions in which the Supreme Court stopped short of making
such an extension, 75 the Teague court refused to "disrupt the trial pro-
cess by making such an enlargement of the parameters of prior deci-
sions. The Supreme Court recently affirmed Teague on other
grounds, specifically declining to address Teague's sixth amendment
claim.77
b. An Alternative Approach: Booker v. Jabe
At least one circuit deemphasized the Taylor language when it ana-
lyzed the sixth amendment expansion. 78 In Booker v. Jabe, (Booker I)79
the Sixth Circuit held the systematic use of peremptory challenges to
initiation, the Eighth Circuit ordered reargument en banc, specifically requesting the parties to con-
sider People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982). 715 F.2d at 1313-14. In
Payne, an Illinois court applied Taylor and concluded, "the 6th Amendment precludes the State...
from affirmatively frustrating the right of the accused to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community by utilizing peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the jury solely because they
are Blacks." 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1043, 436 N.E.2d at 1052. While the Childress court did not
"entirely disapprove" of the analysis in Payne, it came to a different result. 715 F.2d at 1320. See
infra note 118.
73. 820 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1987) (en bane), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
74. Id. at 841. In Teague, pursuant to the prosecutor's exclusion often black potential jurors, a
nonblack jury convicted the black defendant of attempted murder and armed robbery. Id. at 833.
Teague's contention that such a jury was not comprised of his peers failed in each of the lower
courts.
75. Teague, 820 F.2d at 837-40. See, eg., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975) (requiring merely the possibility of a fair cross section jury);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (requiring a panel of jurors to be indifferent); Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947) (declaring the lack of class representation in an actual jury not alone
an unconstitutional composition); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (recogniz-
ing the distinction between a jury comprised of a fair cross section and an impartial jury) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
76. 820 F.2d at 841.
77. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Because the Court relied on procedural grounds
when it declined to address the sixth amendment issue, the Court's affirmance of Teague's conviction
does not moot consideration of either the rationale of petitioner's claim or the Seventh Circuit's
analysis.
78. The Sixth Circuit in Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 770 (6th Cir. 1985) (Booker 1), did
recognize Taylor as the "seminal authority governing the application of the Sixth Amendment to
state jury trials." Moreover, the court did cite the critical Taylor language. Id. at 768. However,
the Booker I court chose an alternative line of Supreme Court authority from which to base its sixth
amendment extension to the petit jury. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. The rationale
underlying the Booker approach, just as in the Taylor approach (see supra notes 64, 66-67 and ac-
companying text) remains the same-that selection of the petit jury must preserve the mere possibil-
ity of a fair cross section.
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exclude members of a cognizable group from a criminal petit jury vio-
lates the sixth amendment.80 The court reasoned that Swain foreclosed
the defendant's fourteenth amendment claim, but it did not exempt per-
emptory challenges from sixth amendment review." The Booker I court
relied on the principles of a series of Supreme Court cases in construing
the true nature of the "impartial jury" guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. 82 The court concluded that the "selection methods" for both the
venire and the actual jury must guarantee the "possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community."83  On appeal, the
Supreme Court remanded Booker 184 pursuant to Batson. On remand
the Sixth Circuit in Booker v. Jabe (Booker II) adhered to its prior
ruling.8 5
79. 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), aff'd, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir.
1986).
80. Id. at 772. Booker I involved the removal of jurors by both the prosecution and defense on
the basis of race. Id. at 764-65. Booker and his codefendant, both black, faced armed robbery
charges. Id. Booker's co-defendant faced an additional charge of intent to commit rape on a white
female. Id. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove blacks. Id. An all-white jury
convicted Booker. Id. at 763.
81. Id. at 767.
82. Id. at 768-70.
Collectively, Glasser, Thiel and Ballard teach that an impartial jury is the product of jury
selection methods that do not systematically exclude members of a distinct group from jury
service.... [A sixth amendment] violation lies in the exclusionary conduct or policy, not
in any documented partiality by a particular jury.
Id. at 769.
83. Id. at 770-71.
84. 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). ChiefJustice Burger believed the Supreme Court simply should have
reversed Booker L Id. at 1001-02 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As in McCray, however, the Court
chose to remand. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
85. Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The Supreme Court denied the
state's petition for certiorari. Michigan v. Booker, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987). This case perhaps furthers
the proposition derived from McCray v. Abrams-that the sixth amendment analysis is viable-
because the Sixth Circuit actually decided, on remand, to adhere to its prior decision. The Second
Circuit in McCray did not have that opportunity, see infra note 86. In light of its action in Roman v.
Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989), however, the Second
Circuit would likely have reaffirmed its prior decision.
Roman involved a joint trial of two white defendants who subsequently alleged the prosecutor
improperly utilized his peremptories to exclude whites from the petit jury. Id. at 216. The Second
Circuit in Roman expressly praised McCray's sixth amendment analysis. Id. at 215-16. The court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's actions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), Booker I and Booker I to confirm its belief in the
supremacy of the sixth amendment analysis it held viable in McCray. 822 F.2d at 226-27.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT APPROACH
An examination of the circuit cases suggests the viability of applying a
sixth amendment analysis to the petit jury. The Second Circuit's Mc-
Cray v. Abrams decision has meaningful repercussions for the future
breadth of the fair cross section requirement. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion not to reverse McCray but vacate and remand8 6 in light of Allen v.
Hardy8 7 and Batson v. Kentucky I has several implications. First, the
Court would have simply reversed McCray8 9 if it intended to restrict
challenges of discriminatory peremptory use to the equal protection
clause. The Court did not address Batson's or McCray's sixth amend-
ment analysis.90 Therefore, McCray reveals by negative inference the
Court's refusal to restrict challenges to an equal protection analysis.9 1
Second, the Court's remand of McCray may indicate an intent to endorse
a sixth amendment challenge in the future.92 Finally, remanding Mc-
Cray's sixth amendment claim suggests Batson may have sixth amend-
ment implications.93 If so, the breadth of permissible judicial scrutiny
concerning peremptories could possibly94 permit a fair cross section
complaint.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Booker II adds additional
support for application of the sixth amendment analysis.95 Even though
a denial of certiorari has no precedential value,96 at least one court has
noted that "the denial of review in Booker II certainly seems inconsistent
86. 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). Pursuant to the remand, the parties stipulated the state would with-
draw its appeal. Roman, 822 F.2d at 225.
87. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (concerning the retroactivity of Batson). See supra note 16.
88. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
89. See Roman, 822 F.2d at 226 (the Second Circuit's final decision came down before Batson).
The possibility exists that the Court remanded McCray to enable the parties to brief their arguments
in light of an equal protection analysis.
90. McCray, 478 U.S. at 1001. See Roman, 822 F.2d at 226.
91. Accord Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), remanded, 478 U.S. 1000 (1986),
aff'd, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) (similar refusal by Supreme Court to reject sixth amendment
analysis).
92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. But see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-
74 (1986) (Court negated any intent to extend the fair cross section requirement at that time).
93. See supra note 57.
94. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text; infra note 138 and accompanying text and text
accompanying note 139.
95. But see Teague, 820 F.2d at 844 ("subsequent denial of certiorari in... [Booker II] ... [is]
worthy of little weight in our determination").
96. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570




with any view that the remands in McCray and Booker I were meant to
foreclose adherence to our Sixth Amendment analysis." 97
Opponents of the sixth amendment extension note Supreme Court pre-
cedent, such as Lockhart v. McCree,98 as foreshadowing the Court's re-
fusal to apply the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury.99 In
Lockhart the Court refused to extend the fair cross section requirement
to petit juries."oo Nevertheless, the Court expressed ambivalence in fore-
closing all sixth amendment claims by hypothetically entertaining the
sixth amendment argument. ° 1 Furthermore, in light of the Supreme
Court's action in McCray v. Abrams and Booker I, the Court's Lockhart
decision cannot be construed as foreclosing the opportunity for sixth
amendment analysis.' 02 The McCray majority concedes that the sixth
amendment guarantees no particular petit jury composition. 10 3 Nonethe-
less, nothing in Lockhart prevents finding the sixth amendment forbids
peremptory challenge usage that eliminates all possibility that a petit jury
will reflect a cross section of the community."° Arguably, the Lockhart
Court believed it would be premature to take the drastic step of ex-
97. Roman, 822 F.2d at 227.
98. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
99. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1060
(1989).
100. 476 U.S. at 174. The Court recognized the practical impossibility of providing every de-
fendant with a petit jury which was a truly representative cross section of the community. Id. The
Court concluded such a broad extension of the sixth amendment would be "unworkable and un-
sound." Id. See also Teague, 820 F.2d at 840.
101. 476 U.S. at 174 ("if we were willing to extend the fair cross-section requirement to petit
juries. . .").
102. In Lockhart the judge removed for cause all prospective jurors who expressed inability
under any circumstances to impose the death penalty. Id. at 106. The jury convicted the defendant
of murder. Id. The defendant filed a federal habeas corpus petition under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Id.
Although Lockhart is distinguishable from the peremptory challenge situation at issue in this
Note, both concern the same sixth amendment issue.
For a discussion of the history of death-qualified juries, see generally Krauss, The Witherspoon
Doctrine, supra note 20.
103. 750 F.2d at 1128. See supra note 64 and infra note 107.
104. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 226 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989).
It is the preservation of this possibility which comprises the McCray/Booker ideology.
If there is a Sixth Amendment requirement that the venire represent a fair cross section of
the community, it must logically be because it is important that the defendant have the
chance that the petit jury will be similarly constituted. The necessary implication is that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant that possibility.
750 F.2d at 1128-29. See also, Booker I, 775 F.2d at 770-71 (discussion of rationale behind the
guarantee of an impartial jury).
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tending the fair cross section analysis to the actual jury. 10 5
Critics of the sixth amendment argument rely on the Supreme Court's
language in Taylor v. Louisiana 106 that denied a defendant a jury of any
particular composition. 107 In Taylor the Court expressly "impose[d] no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the commu-
nity."' 1 Lower federal courts, however, have misconstrued this lan-
guage 0 19 in considering the premise of the sixth amendment guarantee.110
The sixth amendment fair cross section requirement does not guarantee a
venire of a particular composition."' The requirement merely guaran-
tees the method used for venire selection will provide the possibility of a
representative cross section. 1 2 Similarly, extending the sixth amend-
ment guarantee to the petit jury will do no more than retain the possibil-
ity of a jury comprised of a representative cross section of the
community. 13
Contrary to the holdings by these courts, the Taylor decision actually
supports the sixth amendment's extension to the petit jury. The Court
105. Pursuant to respondent McCree's "invitation" the Court merely "decline[d] ... to adopt
such an extension." Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
106. 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). See supra text accompanying note 64.
107. See, eg., Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1145 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chil-
dress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
108. 419 U.S. at 538.
109. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Despite believing "the extension of Taylor v.
Louisiana from the venire to the petit jury has much logical and practical appeal[,]" the Eighth
Circuit interpreted the Taylor language to limit the fair cross section analysis to the venire. 715 F.2d
at 1319-20.
110. In Booker I, the court elaborated on the rationale requiring the presence of a cross section
of the community drawn from a pool selected absent the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group.
775 F.2d at 770. An impartial jury provides diversity in the judicial process, enabling greater "pub-
lic confidence" in the system. In addition, an impartial jury deters an improper conviction by sup-
plying laypersons' views to interpret the evidence against a defendant. Id.
11. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. To require that a venire reflect a particular
composition would be at least as "unworkable and unsound" as it would be in the context of the petit
jury. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
112. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1092 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for
Petitioner 4); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975); Booker, 775 F.2d at 771. Indeed, "[tfhe
essence of a fair cross-section claim is the systematic exclusion of a 'distinctive' group in the commu-
nity." Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
113. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1092 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Sixth Amendment's command...
applies with equal force to ... petit juries."); Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 226 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989).
Courts such as the Seventh Circuit in Teague v. Lane have misconstrued defendants' sixth amend-




recognized the sixth amendment guarantees a "fair possibility for ob-
taining a jury constituting a representative cross section of the commu-
nity." "4 Unless a fair possibility exists that the actual jury will represent
a cross section of the community, requiring that possibility for venire
selection is senseless.
In addition, the leading cases opposed to the Booker/McCray analysis,
United States v. Childress..5 and Teague v. Lane,"t6 have several defects.
To begin with, although Childress has garnered some support among
other circuits, 17 Childress has two flaws. First, the Eighth Circuit in
Childress expressed ambivalence in its opinion. The court admitted it did
not "entirely disapprove" of the sixth amendment analysis.' 18 It con-
ceded the practicality and logic of extending sixth amendment analysis to
the petit jury." 9 Nevertheless, the court ultimately rejected the sixth
amendment analysis. 20 The second flaw is timing. The Eighth Circuit
decided Childress prior to several important decisions, including Booker
11121 and McCray.'22 Furthermore, neither the Eighth Circuit nor the
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to reconsider Childress in light
of Batson v. Kentucky.123
114, 419 U.S. at 528 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972)).
115, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984). See supra note
72 and accompanying text.
116. 820 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). See supra notes 73-77
and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) (pre-Batson decision
concluding Swain still good law to adjudicate a sixth amendment claim of racial discrimination in
jury selection).
118. 715 F.2d at 1320. The Childress court examined the sixth amendment proposition accepted
in People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982). In Payne, the state court relied
on the sixth amendment to restrict the prosecutor's use of peremptories. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1041-43,
436 N.E.2d at 1051-52, (cited in Childress, 715 F.2d at 1318). The Payne court reasoned "[t]he
systematic exclusion of prospective jurors solely because of their race is equally invidious and uncon-
stitutional at any stage of the jury selection, i.e., from the time the general jury list is prepared...
until the jury is actually selected.' 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1036-37, 436 N.E.2d at 1051-52 (emphasis
added). The Eighth Circuit in Childress recognized Payne when the Childress court made a motion
to rehear the Childress appeal en banc. 715 F.2d at 1313-14. The Eighth Circuit found Payne's sole
reliance on the federal Constitution more significant than other state cases which relied on their state
constitutions. 715 F.2d at 1318.
119, 715 F.2d at 1319. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
120. 715 F.2d at 1318, 1320. The court's reluctance to entirely disprove of the Payne proposi-
tion, notwithstanding its ultimate rejection of the analysis suggests the Eighth Circuit could at some
point change its position. See infra note 123.
121. 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986).
122. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
123. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Childress, a pre-Batson decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on Swain
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The circuit court's opinion in Teague v. Lane has similar deficiencies.
The Seventh Circuit in Teague rested its decision on a mere refusal to
expand the scope of prior Supreme Court decisions. 124 The factors the
court considered in its decision lack accuracy and merit. 125 In addition,
the court misconstrued the essence of the defendant's sixth amendment
claim. 126  Moreover, the court discussed a number of Supreme Court
cases which do not foreclose the viability of a sixth amendment claim. 127
Finally, the Teague court failed in its attempt to minimize128 the support
of a series of cases dealing with jury size. 29 Teague determined a small
number of jurors decreases the opportunity for fair cross section repre-
sentation. 130 Applying similar reasoning to the facts of Teague, remov-
ing potential jurors solely on the basis of race would decrease-if not
eliminate 13'-the opportunity for minority jury representation, 132 and
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Childress Court was "not convinced that Taylor and its sixth
amendment analysis have in effect overruled Swain and now restrict the government's use of the
peremptory challenge to remove black prospective jurors." 715 F.2d at 1320. The court's opinion
suggests a different outcome might result now that the Supreme Court has "reconsidered Swain" in
Batson. Id.
124. 820 F.2d at 839.
125. The court relied on two factors which allegedly "mandate against such an unwarranted
expansion" of precedent. First, the Teague court considered that a randomly selected venire, or a
petit jury selected only with the use of challenge for cause might result in under or over representa-
tion of particular groups. Second, the court considered the administrative problems that would
result if the court required the representation of a specific group on a petit jury. Both factors grow
out of an erroneous belief that proponents of the sixth amendment extension propose a guaranteed
representation of certain groups on a given jury. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. Teague and other defendants relied on sixth amendment entitlement to a fair possibility of a
cross sectional jury. Nowhere did they contend the Constitution guarantees any specific representa-
tion on a jury. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. On appeal in Teague, Justice Brennan
believed the plurality of the court guilty of that same misconstruction or "mischaracterizing" of
petitioner's claim. 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1091 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. See Teague, 820 F.2d at 839-40. Nothing in Batson, Taylor or Lockhart alters the Constitu-
tion's ensuring the chance of a proportionately representative petit jury. Admittedly, "it would be
impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit jury." Id. (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 85-86 n.6).
128. See Teague, 820 F.2d at 842-43.
129. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Williams, the Court held a six member
jury is constitutional because it effectively satisfies the purpose of the jury trial-to protect against
governmental oppression. See also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243 (1978). In Ballew, the
Court held a five member jury violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 243. The Court
suggested a jury of fewer than six may promote "inaccurate and possibly biased decision making,
that causes untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly representing their
communities." Id. at 239 (emphasis added). Such a jury "attains constitutional significance." Id.
130. Teague, 820 F.2d at 837.
131. The court's opinion does not reflect that Teague alleged such improper selection may actu-
ally eliminate all opportunity for minority representation. However, if such conduct effectively de-
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thus violate the sixth amendment. However, the Teague court rejected
this analysis, noting "decreasing the possibility of obtaining a fair cross
section ... does not violate the sixth amendment right to a trial by an
impartial jury." 133  Contrary to the court's reasoning, the systematic
challenge of all blacks solely on the basis of their race would in fact elimi-
nate the very requirement Teague acknowledged: the "possibility of ob-
taining a truly representative jury."'134
An examination of existing case law, therefore, does little to refute the
arguments for extending the fair cross section analysis. However, before
recommending an extension of the fair cross section requirement one
must consider the ramifications of an extension. The Supreme Court
with its decision in Batson has already made a drastic intrusion3 5 into
the traditional nature of peremptory challenges. 3 6 This infringement
upon the peremptory challenge will continue to produce undesirable
repercussions. First, because of the decreased standard for a prima facie
showing of prosecutorial discrimination, defendants will challenge a
prosecutor's conduct more frequently. This will add to the burden of an
already overburdened judicial system.13 7 Second, the bases for intrusion
into discretionary challenges undoubtedly will expand limitlessly. 38
creases minority representation, elimination is the next step. A prosecutor who utilizes his
peremptories solely on the basis of race will continually strike each minority juror until he attains a
non-minority jury, unless he runs out of peremptories first. Given the substantial number of per-
emptories allotted to the prosecutor, see supra note 32, minority representation will likely lose the
race. See VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 140 (number of peremptories allotted is major factor in
impanelling desirable jury).
132. See 820 F.2d at 837 (discussion of defendant Teague's reliance on Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223 (1978) and Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) to support his sixth amendment claim
for the retention of at least an opportunity for minority representation on the jury).
133. Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 1 and 33-35 and text accompanying note.
137. See, e.g., King v. County of Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Bologna, supra
note 14, at 163 (discussing Chief Justice Burger's fear that Batson motions will "clog" courts) (cita-
tion omitted).
138. In Batson, Chief Justice Burger feared the extension of the Batson principle to challenges on
the basis of sex, group affiliation, mental capacity, number of children living arrangements, and
profession. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Her-
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) ("The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely
against discrimination ... based upon differences between 'white' and Negro."); United States v.
Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1021 (1988) (assuming, without decid-
ing, that Batson principles extend to ethnic constituencies); People v. Irizarry, 536 N.Y.S. 2d 630
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (extending Batson to gender-based discrimination). But see United States v.
Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to extend Batson to gender-based discrimi-
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Batson's increased judicial scrutiny may suggest a trend away from defer-
ential treatment. Such a trend could extend the lenient Batson standard
to racial and nonracial attacks on grounds other than equal protection,
thereby opening the door to a sixth amendment objection. 139 Finally,
unless the Supreme Court clarifies the permissible scope of sixth amend-
ment challenges,"40 attorneys and judges will continue to misinterpret the
law. 141
Moreover, the desirability of a sixth amendment extension is question-
able. The extension would provide greater opportunity to challenge the
improper use of peremptory challenges 42 and consequently might deter
discriminatory conduct. However, permitting substantial judicial scru-
tiny of peremptories would undeniably destroy their original purpose of
allowing unquestioned exclusion, making survival of the peremptory
challenge doubtful.14 3 In addition, the Courts' burden would increase,
given the potentially infinite challenges based on sixth amendment
grounds.'44
Even if the Court refuses to extended sixth amendment analysis to the
petit jury composition, the existing scrutiny made possible in Batson
nation); Note, supra note 2, at 1213 (other classifications do not merit same protection under equal
protection clause as does race, hence, Batson will not necessarily extend further).
139. In McCray v. Abrams, Judge Meskill in dissent, expressed concern regarding the limitless-
ness of the sixth amendment analysis. 750 F.2d 1113, 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting).
Judge Meskill feared the less burdensome standard for a prima facie case under the sixth amend-
ment--showing the exclusion of a cognizable or distinctive group-will eliminate the use of per-
emptories for all but the most frivolous reasons. Id. See supra note 23. See also United States v.
Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984); infra note 147.
140. See supra note 20.
141. Such misinterpretation exists in Sgro, 816 F.2d at 30. The defendant in Sgro claimed the
government improperly used its peremptory challenges to exclude Italian-Americans from the jury,
in violation of equal protection under Batson. A jury without any Italian-American members con-
victed the Italian-American defendant. The First Circuit affirmed Sgro's conviction. In its analysis,
the court utilized the standard from Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979), to define a "consti-
tutionally cognizable group." 816 F.2d at 33. The court's reliance on this standard is misplaced
because Duren involved a sixth amendment, not equal protection, analysis of a jury venire from
which the state excluded all women as a group. The Duren Court held the defendant established a
prima facie case of discrimination against women, producing a jury in violation of the fair cross
section requirement. 439 U.S. at 367-70. See supra notes 54 & 68 (recognizing different standards
for equal protection and sixth amendment claims).
142. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. The sixth amendment challenge would likely
be broader than its equal protection counterpart.
143. See infra note 146.
144. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the limitlessness of sixth amendment claim and its undesirable consequences), vacated, 478
U.S. 1001 (1986), and supra note 139.
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thwarts the efficacy of peremptory challenges.' The intrusion already
allowed in Batson may alone destroy the peremptory challenge.' 46 Fu-
ture courts may also apply Batson to a broader scope of cases other than
those concerning the exclusion of blacks. 4 7
IV. PROPOSAL
Peremptory challenges do not fulfill their purpose unless exercised
with full freedom. 4 ' Therefore, unless the Court preserves the unquali-
fied nature of peremptories, the Court will deny peremptories their in-
tended and necessary flexibility. Peremptory challenges mock their
purpose when misused. 49 Regardless of the Court's ultimate decision on
the sixth amendment issue, its decisions to date have decimated the per-
emptory challenge.15 0
145. "Jury trials once were simple, straightforward, and expeditious proceedings; and the right
to jury trial was a right that defendants got not merely one that they had .... [We appear to be
headed in the wrong direction, and Batson illustrates some fundamental defects of American trial
procedure. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 79 (footnote omitted).
146. See infra note 147. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125-26 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (the Batson decision "sets aside the peremptory challenge"); United States v. Clark, 737
F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) ("opponent would have to come forward with a reason for wanting to
exclude the juror.... [i]n other words he would have to provide good cause, or something very close
to it; and the peremptory challenge would collapse into the challenge for cause"). But see Batson,
476 U.S. at 97 (though potentially limiting "the full peremptory character of the historic challenge"
it "need not rise to the level justifying... challenge for cause").
147. United States v. Clark, although decided prior to Batson, effectively expresses the fear ac-
companying such intrusive inquiry into the use of peremptories.
If such objections [to an adversary's use of peremptories] are allowed, it is hard to see how
the peremptory challenge ... will survive. Whenever counsel alleged that his opponent
had a racial or similar type of motivation in exercising a peremptory challenge (whether he
used that challenge to exclude a white or a black-and it would have to be one or the
other--or, extending the principle as one could hardly resist doing, a man or a woman, a
Jew or a gentile, etc) the opponent would have to come forward with a reason for wanting
to exclude the juror.
737 F.2d at 682 (emphasis added). See also Alschuler, supra note 20, at 65 (Although limiting of
Batson to cases of racial discrimination is "unattractive," an extension of Batson might leave "little
left of the peremptory challenge.").
148. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (decision
will not undermine the value of peremptory challenges to the administration of justice).
149. First, any assertion that peremptories serve to keep questions of race out of the jury
selection process is empty in the face of Batson, Booker, and McCray. Clearly, these are
cases in which this time-honored right has been misused in a manner that propels racial
issues to the forefront. Secondly it is said that peremptories protect minority jurors from
oppression at the hands of their communities; the best that can be said for this idea is that
it is condescending.
Bologna, supra note 14, at 164 (citations omitted).
150. See supra notes 1, 145-47 and accompanying text and infra note 157. This destruction of
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A. Alternatives
In light of the inherent deficiencies of peremptories, the Court should
consider a reevaluation of the peremptory challenge. One alternative
may be to eliminate the prosecutor's right but preserve defense counsel's
right to use peremptory challenges. This solution would better protect
defendants from historical prosecutorial discrimination. However, it
would have the drastic disadvantage of enabling the accused to select a
jury biased in his favor. 151 A second alternative might be to reduce the
the traditional peremptory challenge is precisely what the Supreme Court feared as early as 1965 in
Swain. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
151. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 766 (6th Cir. 1985), remanded, 478 U.S. 1000 (1986), aff'd,
801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). The sixth amendment does not afford the defendant a "partial" jury. Booker, 775 F.2d
at 772.
Nonetheless, support exists for treating the prosecutor differently than the defendant. To begin
with, the Constitution affords no particular right to the "prosecution." In contrast, the sixth amend-
ment protects only an "accused," while the fourteenth amendment protects "any person" from cer-
tain conduct of the "State." In addition, the prosecution generally possesses fewer allotted
challenges than the defense. Bologna, supra note 14, at 151. This different treatment may also be
the system's acknowledgment that prosecutors use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory man-
ner more often than defendants. But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting the need to balance the "scales" between the defendant and state by similarly limiting the
defense's discriminatory use of peremptories); Booker, 775 F.2d at 772 ("neither prosecutor nor
defense counsel may improperly use their peremptories"); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1138-
39 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (because restrictions on the defense's use of challenges are
probable once the prosecutor's use is limited, it will likely "spell the end of peremptory challenges")
(quoting United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 250 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977)), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001
(1986); Clark, 737 F.2d at 682 (recognizing the need to provide prosecutors with comparative pro-
tection against discrimination).
In an analysis of this so-called reverse-Batson issue, one commentator supports the need for an
equivalent power for a prosecutor to attack the defense's use of peremptories. However, he recog-
nizes the standing dilemma accompanying such a concept. As with the standing issue presented
when a defendant alleges discrimination against a group other than his own, see supra note 21, this
commentator would reconcile both problems by approving a less "restricted concept of [third-party]
standing." Alschuler, supra note 20, at 73.
Another commentator believes the selection of constitutional approach of the challenge made
against a defense attorney's use of his peremptories may be dispositive on this reverse-Batson issue.
A fair cross section limitation, for example, will apply equally to the defense as to the prosecution.
An equal protection challenge, on the contrary, raises concerns of the absence of state action and
standing. Fisher, Batson v. Kentucky: Purposeful Discrimination in Jury Selection, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
3, 1988, at 1, Col. 2. Hence, a resolution of the potential sixth amendment extension may have
significant bearing on the viability of a future, reverse-Batson extension.
The Court in Batson specifically declined to "express ... whether the Constitution imposes any
limit on the excercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel." 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. The
Supreme Court recently declined to settle the reverse-Batson controversy when it denied the state of
Alabama's petition for certiorari in Alabama v. Cox, 109 S. Ct. 817 (1989). In that case, the state
sought to restrict the defense's use of its peremptory challenges. The state claimed that in the trial of
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number of challenges allotted.'52 A reduction in challenges would pro-
vide fewer opportunities for discriminatory use.153 However, the pres-
ence of a few peremptory challenges will still afford attorneys some
flexibility in jury selection. 154
A third alternative might be to recognize a right to minority represen-
tation on the jury. 155 This would protect minority defendants by provid-
ing for their representation on a jury. However, such a solution would
require the court to impose an unconstitutional quota. 56
Given the apparent dissatisfaction and potential catastrophe accompa-
nying Batson,'57 a fourth alternative would be for the court to either
modify or overrule Batson 158 and revert to the rigorous burden of Swain.
While this would solve the current dissatisfaction with Batson and pre-
vent any future poor decisions caused by courts misinterpreting Batson,
such a return to Swain "I would be unsatisfactory. The defense's virtual
inability to meet the Swain burden"6 would deprive defendants of any
recourse against the prosecution's discriminatory jury selection.
two Ku Klux Klan members accused of killing a black man, the defense impermissibly struck all
blacks from the jury.
152. There are two possible alternatives. Jurisdictions may decide to reduce the privilege for
both parties. This would maintain the "even-handed balance" between the litigants (Booker I, 775
F.2d at 766) yet still reduce their opportunity to discriminate. On the other hand, jurisdictions
might reduce only the prosecution's number of challenges. This alternative is not necessarily unfair
considering the existing disparate treatment. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
153. But see United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1021
(1988) (defendant still claimed the government unconstitutionally discriminated pursuant to prose-
cutor's challenges to the only two Italian surnamed jurors in the venire).
154. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
155. Bologna, supra note 14, at 165.
156. Id.
157. The inescapable first impression drawn from the Batson jurisprudence is failure. The
Supreme Court's "middle-ground" remedy, which attempted to eliminate discriminatory jury selec-
tion while at the same time preserving the common law institution of peremptory challenge, has thus
far disserved both interests. Racism can still pervert jury selection, and prosecutorial explanation
has bastardized the peremptory challenge. Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 62
(1988). See also Alschuler, supra note 20 at 78. (Batson "added further complications to an already
complicated system of criminal procedure."). See supra notes 140-145, 147-148 and accompanying
text.
158. See Serf & Maney, supra note 157, at 63 (Batson leaves the Court with two alternatives:
return to Swain or eliminate peremptories altogether). See infra notes 161-168 and accompanying
text for consideration of a ban on peremptory challenges.
159. See supra notes 6, 49-52 and accompanying text. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113,
1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (supporting a return to Swain), vacated 478 U.S. 1001
(1986).
160. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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B. Solution
Peremptories do little more than provide a vehicle for jury selection
manipulation. In addition, they burden the judicial system with addi-
tional causes of action for litigants claiming discrimination. Although
peremptories may provide flexibility in jury selection, they fail to effect
the intended impartial jury. In reality, they provide an opportunity for
each party to select a partial jury. Essentially no distinction exists be-
tween an unconstitutional law purposefully excluding a group solely on
the basis of race161 and a prosecutor's peremptory challenge misuse in a
discriminatory manner.162 Both involve a form of inappropriate state ac-
tion. The Court should not condone either conduct. As a solution, this
Note proposes the elimination of peremptory challenges.
This suggestion has received some support, most notably by Justice
Marshall in his Batson concurrence. 163 Justice Marshall recognized that
the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right.' 1  He articulated
that a court may withhold peremptory challenges "without impairing the
constitutional guarantee of impartial jury and fair trial." '65 As noted
above, 166 the court must withhold the peremptory challenge should the
challenge impair a constitutionally granted right.1 67
Such a solution is problematic because it would require a reconstruc-
tion of current jury selection procedure. Peremptories supply attorneys
with significant discretion in jury selection. Therefore, attorneys will
likely disfavor the elimination of such cause-less challenges.
To minimize the harsh impact of this solution, the Court might con-
sider increasing the allowable criteria of challenges for cause. 68 This in-
crease would provide attorneys with more flexibility in challenging jurors
yet deter the unconstitutional discriminatory elimination of jurors.
161. See, eg., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); supra note 42.
162. Bologna, supra note 14, at 166. "The reality of the practice .,. shows that the challenge
may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate .... Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 98 (1986). The court in United States v. Clark feared that entertaining certain objections to
peremptory challenge use would undesirably stretch out trials. 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984).
163. Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring); Bertolet, supra note 32, at 26. But see
Bologna, supra note 14, at 164-65 (conceding that the elimination of peremptory challenges would
"provoke a rash of protest from the trial bar.").
164. 476 U.S. at 108. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
165. 476 U.S. at 108 (citations omitted).
166. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (the inscrutability of the peremptory challenge
must yield to a constitutionally granted right).





The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky' 69 left many
questions unanswered.' 70 The question of whether the sixth amendment
guarantees a defendant the possibility of a cross sectional petit jury re-
mains unresolved. In light of the conflict among the circuits171 the issue
is ripe for adjudication. 172
The peremptory challenge is a paradox, by nature immune to review,
but nonetheless subject to constitutional scrutiny. Because of the per-
emptory challenge's deficiencies, 173 its elimination may better protect liti-
gants and their constitutional rights.
Patricia E. Sacks
169. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
170. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
173. See, eg., supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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